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Abstract
We address the design of point scoring
mechanisms in games for crowds, to promote user
motivations to contribute knowledge. We measure the
effectiveness of the scoring mechanism on users’
performance across three types of crowd: general
public, students in their field of study, general
students. The conditions were: reward-free games
(control group) and two reward-based systems
differing in the algorithm applied (linear y=3x vs.
exponential y=6ex). Results support the importance of
the mathematical function of scores assignment as a
motivator for knowledge contribution, and indicate
that the effect of the scoring mechanism design
should be tailored according to the type of crowd.
These findings provide insights for designers of
gamified systems on how to improve knowledge
contributions in crowd-based systems.

1. Introduction
The success of knowledge pooling initiatives such
as Wikipedia or Yahoo! Answers largely depends
upon the motivation for participation of each
contributor. The participation in crowd-based
activities often follows a power law distribution,
meaning that the crowd is heterogeneous in terms of
motivation to contribute. However, the term 'crowd'
in the literature often symbolizes a 'black box' of
participants [1]. In this study we investigate the
content of the 'black box' by probing the sensitivity of
three types of crowd to various point scoring
mechanism designs in a knowledge pooling
assignment.
Gamification has emerged as a way to describe
interactive online design that incorporates game-like
approaches such as immediate feedback and virtual
rewards (points, badges, gifts etc.), or status
indicators (levels, progress bar, count of likes/
friends/ followers/ retweets etc.). Gamification
rapidly built momentum in industry [2] and academia
creating a stream of research [3,4]. To date,
gamification is applied in marketing as well as nonbusiness contexts such as politics, health [5], problem
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solving [6], work [7], online communities and social
network [4]; computer science and engineering [8, 9]
crowdsourcing [4, 6] and education [10].
Gamification brings opportunities but it is still
unclear whether it is used properly in order to reach
objectives [3, 4].
Gamification and crowdsourcing can be
considered as interrelated as they share
commonalities [11]: potentially large user numbers,
requirements for scalability, potential for reusable
functionality etc. Researchers see gamification as a
way to incentivize people to voluntarily contribute to
crowdsourcing tasks [3, 4, 11-13]. Still, these studies
share several weaknesses: relying on a small sample
size, simultaneous implementation of several
gamification elements, lack of comparative
examination of various types of crowd involved,
disregard of individual characteristics. So far, scant
research has been conducted to draw clear
conclusions as to which specific game element would
work better in certain situations and types of crowd.
This dearth of understanding prevents organizations
from adopting and designing effective gamification
approaches.
The present study aims to: 1) shed light on the
impact of the scoring mechanism design on players’
behavior in a game designed for pooling knowledge.
2) examine the term crowds in regard to gamification
while comparing different types of crowd in one
gamification implementation 3) empirically evaluate
scoring mechanism effectiveness as a tool for
motivating and engaging users in non-entertainment
contexts 4) strengthen the theoretical foundations of
gamification.
After a brief introduction to gamification and
crowds, the ﬁrst part of this paper examines the
motivational factors of scores and how scoring
mechanism design can be associated with behavior.
Following a description of Guess, a knowledgepooling game for crowds, which serves as our
research tool, we describe a repeated measures
experiment to investigate how scoring patterns
influence users’ performance. We end this paper
with a summary of ﬁndings, including suggestions
for future research.
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2. Background
2.1. Gamification and crowds
The development of social Web technologies
enables harnessing large crowds of users for various
tasks such as contribution of knowledge, data
collection, and problem solving activities [14, 15].
The body of literature on crowdsourcing has been
rapidly growing [11] offering four categories to
describe crowdsourcing systems: crowdsolving,
crowdcreation, crowdrating and crowdprocessing
[16] and a conceptual framework of crowd capital
[13, 17]. An active crowd of participants is crucial for
such systems, raising the question of providing
tailored incentives that will promote user motivation
[18, 19]. Traditional approaches focus on economic
approaches including tangible incentives such as
monetary prizes [4, 11, 18, 19], algorithmic
approaches such as improving software [20],
encouraging social-psychological perspectives on the
notion of gaining reputation [21], or expression of
open-source ideology [22]. A recent direction is
offering the enjoyable qualities of gameplay in nongame systems, coined as gamification [23].
Consequently, gamification can be seen as an aspect
of incentives for people to voluntarily contribute to
crowdsourcing tasks. Well-known examples in this
regard are: Foldit 1 [24], Phrase Detective2 [25],
Phylo3, DARPA Formal Verification program4 and
Games with a Purpose (GWAP) [26].
Gamification has become a popular strategic
instrument to engage people in a given activity, to
influence behavior and increase performance and
productivity in various contexts [12, 27, 28]. It is one
of the major instruments for driving users’ motivation
in crowdsourcing systems [4], i.e “Transforming
Homo Economicus into Homo Ludens” [29].
Interestingly,
most
studies
combining
crowdsourcing and gamification consider the term
'crowd' as a uniform concept that varies in amount
rather than type, referring to an unspecified crowd
[1]. Early empirical studies in this direction suggest
to examine effects of gender and age on gamification
effectiveness [4, 30]. Our study questions the overall
crowd type rather than its particular composition.
Given the gamified system, our focus is on
differences in gamification effectiveness among three
types of crowd: general public (GenPub), general
1
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students (GenStu), and expert students (ExpStu),
defined in Table 2.

2.2. Motivation theories
We test score mechanism design as motivator for
sharing knowledge in a game for crowds, drawing on
Csikszentmihalyi's Flow theory [31] and selfdetermination theory [32] to examine motivational
effects in crowdsourcing [33] and gamification [3, 4,
12, 34]. Scores can be regarded as providing
feedback which is an important antecedent to flow
and engagement, and are mapped to the competence
aspect of self-determination theory [4, 12, 27].
According to the game design elements taxonomy
provided by Blohm and Leimeister, mechanisms such
as scoring systems or badges create dynamics of
collection which satisfy achievement motivation [27].
Thus, the motivational appeal of points is based upon
their cumulative nature. By adding a certain number
of points for completed actions to users’ accounts the
game keeps users engaged and encourages them to
remain active [26, 35]. Although scoring mechanism
design is a key component in making engaging
games, only few empirical studies to date investigate
their role on users’ motivation and behavior [36-41].
The current study aims to address this gap.
Motivation is usually divided to intrinsic and
extrinsic motivational factors. Intrinsic motivation
applies to doing something because it is inherently
interesting or enjoyable, while extrinsic motivation
refers to doing something because it leads to a
separable outcome [42]. In contrast, selfdetermination theory (SDT) defines intrinsic and
subtypes of extrinsic motivation as falling along a
continuum of internalization [32]. Cognitive
evaluation theory (CET) and organismic integration
theory (OIT) two sub-theories of SDT are of great
importance in the study of gamification. According to
CET, feedback, which is perceived as informing
one’s mastery, supports the need for competence and,
subsequently,
enhances
intrinsic
motivation.
However, if feedback is perceived as controlling,
then it reduces intrinsic motivation [42]. Within OIT,
supports for autonomy and relatedness are critical to
internalization; individuals can experience a sense of
autonomy even when behaviors are extrinsically
rewarded [42]. The idea of contributing to collective
good; voluntary participation and full control on
one’s action; feedback messages and scores to
develop competence and self-competition are the
implementation of SDT in our study.

2
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2.3. Motivational factors of points and scores

4. Method

Within games, points play various roles: as a
scoring system, a progression indicator, scale of rank,
goal setting tool or even as a currency [12, 43].
Removal of a points-based incentive system can
make a negative impact on players’ activity; it may
reduce overall participation [36]. Points add
excitement to games by creating an artificial ladder
from which players can fall if they make a mistake
[39]. Points stimulate self-regulation and selfefficacy by providing direct input on performance,
and thus afford regulating and monitoring
performance more accurately [12]. The social effect
of points ranges from status earned by performing
certain actions up to reputation that is based on
ratings received by others. Therefore, the
motivational aspect of points is outlined with the help
of social motivations as well as needs-based theories
and rewards-based theory [12]. Gamification in
crowdsourcing often uses a metric (scores) as a core
reward for users’ effort [11]. Further analyzing the
scoring mechanism in regard to the four types of
crowdsourcing systems based on [16] reveals that in
most crowd-processing, crowd rating and crowd
solving settings, the scoring mechanism design
measures task fulfillment. Only few studies to date
have provided an explanation or describe how the
scoring mechanism is actually designed in crowdcreated settings [11, 38, 40, 44]. Consequently it
remains a question to explore.

4.1. GUESS: a game for crowds

3. Research questions
The lack of comprehensive understanding of
scoring mechanism constrains the design of effective
incentive systems for crowdsourcing. To evaluate the
effect of the scoring system we designed a controlled
study. In this context, we present three main research
questions that summarize the goals of this study.
RQ1: Does assigning points affect performance in
games for crowds? If so, how?
RQ2: How do different score mechanism designs
affect performance in games for crowds?
Further, both crowdsourcing and gamification can
take a variety of forms, and it would be myopic to
assume that the same gamification implementations
would function similarly across different types of
crowd and different crowdsourcing approaches.
RQ3: Does the effect of the scoring design on users'
performance depend on the type of crowd
participating?

We used a crowd- based knowledge pooling word
association game called “Guess” which was
developed by IBM5. Knowledge accumulates by
prompting questions simultaneously to all users who,
in turn, receive points for responses.

Figure 1. Main game interface
4.1.1. User interface. Users access a personalized
home screen where they select a game to play from
the available games. Figure 1 presents the main
game interface. A question with an input box appears
on top (example question: Name famous scientists).
Users are encouraged to submit as many responses as
they can by typing them in the input box within the
time frame of 60 seconds per question (Example
responses: Einstein, Newton, Curie). By pressing the
SKIP button users can move on to the next question
before the time expires or if they prefer not to
respond. Responses are presented in the peripheral
circles (see Figure 1). The black dots denote
responses given by other users. Once the user types a
response that had been already given by another user,
the black dot opens and the response appears,
however, there is no direct interaction between users
[1]. Additional on-screen information includes: time
remaining, user’s statistics (dynamic update of
current total points), basic game statistics (number of
players, number of responses given by all players).
Once users enter a response they receive a feedback
message. We used 3 types of text messages: (1) ‘You
got X points’- indicating how many points were
gained for the current response; (2) ‘you already
mentioned this answer’ to inform users when they
type a response that they have already mentioned; (3)
acknowledging submission by ‘submitted ABC’
(ABC= response) specifically for reward-free games.
5

GUESS- Gaming Umbrella for Enterprise Social Sourcing
https://www.research.ibm.com/haifa/projects/imt/social/guess.shtm
l
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The game ends with a "game over" notification and a
display of some game statistics and a leaderboard.
4.1.2. Designing the score mechanism. For this
study a new scoring wizard was implemented in the
game in order to allow fast adjustments of the
algorithm applied. The goal was to compare rewardfree gaming with external rewards in the form of
points. Beyond that we compared usage of a
monotonic and expected linear scoring mechanism
with an irregular and incalculable (for the user)
scoring mechanism. Three reward conditions were
implemented: (1) reward-free condition (control); and
two conditions that differ in the algorithm applied;
(2) linear function: y=3x (3) exponential function:
y=6ex. The linear score-keeping function provides the
user a constant number of points for each submitted
response. Because such functions are regular, users
may become uninterested and quit the game. Part of
the fun of games comes from their unexpected nature
[45]. In order to make game scores less predictable,
we introduced a new function using an exponential
progression. Although both conditions present
positive and ever growing scores, in the linear
condition users can figure out fairly quickly how the
scores are calculated and will know what to expect,
while in the second condition the score is unexpected.
Figure 2 illustrates point accumulations in both
functions.

Figure 2. Point accumulation linear vs.
exponential function

4.2. Operationalizing performance
Following common behavioral metrics of
performance in gamification research we suggest to
look at users’ performance in two dimensional prism:
the outcome and the process. Table 1 depicts these
two dimensions along with some metrics GUESS
produces for each user (log analysis).

6

Table 1. Performance metrics
Dependent
Metrics (calculation)
variable
Outcome Contribution Average amount of content
contributed (# of
responses) per question
Participation Percentage of questions
answered (proportion of
answered questions out of
all questions available in a
game)
Process
Duration
Average gameplay time per
question
Engagement Utilization of playing time
time
(proportion of gameplay
time out of maximum
possible time)

4.3. Procedure
GUESS was deployed implementing a control
and two manipulations of scoring mechanism designs
in two events of The European Researchers' Night
which is a “popular science and fun learning“ event
open to the general public, and in five university
courses, three at the Faculty of Management and two
at the Faculty of Education. Participation was
voluntary; yet we offered a modest prize (a pair of
movie tickets) to the highest score in the Researchers'
Night events; lecturers rewarded their students with 1
or 2 bonus points for participation.
Participants were asked to play one game in each
of the three experimental conditions: reward-free
games (users saw a pop-up message indicating their
contribution), and 2 reward-based systems differing
in the algorithm applied (linear y=3x vs. exponential
y=6ex). Participants selected the order in which to
play the games. A pop-up message indicated the
number of points earned for the current response
contribution. The data collected from this period
includes 21 games, 7 games in each scoring
condition. Group size (number of participants in a
game) ranges from 13 to 53. A total of 17,752
responses were gathered, distributed as follow:
reward-free games 3,681 responses, linear 6,697
responses and exponential 7,374 responses. For the
evaluation, we examined the server logs, which
documented the details of each response provided by
users in a game along with a time-stamp.

6

We use the natural logarithm transformation for both
contribution and duration in order to transform data to normal
distribution
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4.4. Participants
Table 4. Distribution of game-rounds
We identified three types of crowd: general
public, expert students and general students as
defined in Table 2. 576 participants played at least
one game in one of three conditions (Table 3). 53
participants replayed at least one game; for them we
calculated the average of contributed responses along
the repeated games. The number of game replays for
a user in a certain game varied between 1 to 10 times
(Table 4).
Table 2. Types of crowd, size and definition
Types of
crowd
GenPub
general
public
(t1)

N

%

Definition

154

26.74

ExpStu
expert
students
(t2)
GenStu
general
students(t3)

202

35.07

People attending The
European Researchers'
Night events, answering
general questions that
require common
knowledge
Students responding to
professional questions
in their field of study

220

38.19

Students responding to
general questions

K=no. of
gamerounds

Frequency

Percent

1
2
3
4
5
6
10

523
40
6
3
2
1
1

90.80
6.94
1.04
0.52
0.35
0.17
0.17

Frequencies
according to
respective
types of crowd
t1
t2
t3
139 194 190
11
7
22
4
2
1
2
2
1
1

random variable was the user, the explanatory
variables: scoring mechanism design(c), type of
crowds (t), group size (d) and number of game
rounds (k). The dependent variables were:
contribution, participation, duration, and engagement
time. A backward elimination procedure was used,
whereby non-significant terms were dropped one by
one and the model re-assessed to determine the
significance of each of the remaining variables at
every stage.
Contribution: Table 5.1 shows the final set of
variables in the model. The analysis yielded that all
effects were statistically significant at p < .05.

Table 3. Number of participants per condition
Condition
Notation N
%
Reward-free
c0
183 31.77
Linear score mechanism
c1
192 33.33
Exponential score
c2
201 34.90
mechanism

Table 5.1 Model results showing factors
affecting mean change in contribution
Variables in the
df
F
Sig
model
Condition (c)
2
6.99
0.0011
Group size (d)
1
23.10 <.0001

We compare behavioral performance among the
three scoring conditions in regard to three types of
crowd. The independent variables are: the scoring
mechanism design (c0, c1, c2), the types of crowd
(t1, t2, t3), group size (d; number of participants in a
certain game) and number of game rounds (k). The
dependent variable, performance, was introduced in
Table 1.

Type of crowds (t)
2
25.80 <.0001
c*t
4
2.68
0.0315
A Post hoc analysis using the Bonferroni
correction further revealed that for GenPub (t1) the
mean for the exponential scoring design (c2) was
significantly higher than the means for both the linear
and reward–free conditions (M = 1.71, SD =0.68; M
= 1.52, SD = 0.6; M = 1.63, SD = 0.59 respectively).
No significant difference was found between the
linear (c1) and reward –free conditions (c0). For the
ExpStu (t2) the mean of the exponential condition
(c2) was significantly higher than the mean for
reward-free condition (c0) (M = 1.45, SD =0.72, M =
1.18, SD = 0.62; respectively). No significant
difference was found when the linear and reward-free
conditions were compared or when the linear and
exponential were compared. For the GenStu (t3) no
significant differences were found among the three

5. Results
To compare results from manipulation conditions
7
with those from control condition an HLM model
(Hierarchical Linear Modeling) was conducted. The
7

HLM can accommodate nested data structure with repeated
observations on the same participant, with a lack of sphericity and
missing data.
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conditions. The interaction can be seen in Figure 3. In
addition, group size main effect was significant
(F(1,325)=23.10, p<.001) indicating that the larger the
group, the lower the contribution of responses.

effective to use reward-free or exponential scoring
design while for ExpStu exponential scoring design
may be a less effective method to promote
participation. In addition, there was a significant
main effect of group size (F(1,284)=5.61, p < .05)
indicating that participation decreases the larger the
group.

Figure 3. Interaction plot for contribution
Participation: a hierarchical logistic model was
conducted to predict the probability to fulfill the task
i.e. answering all the questions in the game (or logout
from the game before it ends). Table 5.2 shows the
results of the regression analysis.
Table 5.2 Model results showing factors
affecting mean change in participation
Variables in the model df F Value
Sig
Condition (c)
2
5.24 0.0058
Group size (d)
1
5.61 0.0186
Type of crowds (t)
2
19.49 <.0001
c*t
4
6.27 <.0001
The analysis yielded that all effects were
statistically significant at p < .05 significance level.
Further analysis using the Bonferroni correction
revealed that for the GenPub (t1) the probability of
answering all questions and completing the task for
the linear scoring design (c1) was significantly
lower than both the exponential and reward–free
conditions (45%, 59%, 61% respectively). No
significant difference was found between the
exponential (c2) and reward–free conditions (c0). For
the ExpStu (t2) the exponential condition (c2) was
significantly lower than reward-free and linear
conditions (66%, 83% and 79% respectively). No
significant difference was found when the linear and
reward free conditions were compared. For the
GenStu group (t3) the linear scoring design (c1) was
significantly lower than both the exponential and
reward–free
conditions
(77%,
83%,
82%
respectively). No significant difference was found
between the exponential (c2) and reward–free
conditions (c0) (Figure 4). These results suggests that
for both GenPub and GenStu it may be more

Figure 4. Participation per crowd type and
scoring mechanism
Duration: Table 5.3 shows the final set of
variables in the model in regard to duration.
Table 5.3 Model results showing factors
affecting mean change in duration
Variables in the model df F Value
Sig
Condition (c)
2
3.07 0.0480
Group size (d)
1
5.67 0.0178
Type of crowds (t)
2
16.92 <.0001
The analysis yielded that all main effects were
statistically significant at p < .05. For the main effect
of score design (F(2, 329) = 3.07, p < .05), indicates that
there is an overall significant difference in means,
post hoc tests using the Bonferroni correction
revealed that duration was significantly higher for
exponential condition (M = 3.94, SD = 0.29) than for
reward-free (M = 3.88, SD = 0.29). There was no
statistically significant difference between the linear
and both reward free and exponential scoring. For
the main effect of types of crowd (F(2, 329) = 16.92, p
< .001), post hoc tests using the Bonferroni
correction revealed that duration was significantly
higher for GenStu (t3) (M = 4.01, SD = 0.18) than
for both GenPub (t1) and ExpStu (t2) (M = 3.90, SD
= 0.31; M = 3.79, SD = 0.38; respectively). There
was no statistically significant difference between t1
and t2. Figure 5 illustrates the findings.
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Figure 5. Duration per crowd type and
scoring mechanism
In addition, group size main effect was significant
(F(1,329)=5.67, p<.05) indicating that duration
decreases the larger the group.
Engagement time: The analysis yielded that all
main effects were statistically significant at the p <
.05 significance level as can be seen in Table 5.4.
Table 5.4 Model results showing factors
affecting mean change in engagement time
Variables in the model
df F Value
Sig
Condition (c)
2
4.16 0.0165
Group size (d)
1
10.51 0.0013
Type of crowds (t)
2
24.91 <.0001
Number of game rounds (k) 1
37.22 <.0001
c*t
4
2.41 0.0490
A Post hoc analysis using the Bonferroni
correction further revealed that for the GenPub (t1)
the mean for the exponential scoring design (c2) was
significantly higher than the means for both the linear
and reward–free conditions (M = 0.76, SD =0.30; M
= 0.68, SD = 0.34; M = 0.72, SD = 0.31
respectively). No significant difference was found
between the linear (c1) and reward–free conditions
(c0). For the ExpStu (t2) no significant difference

Figure 6. Interaction plot for engagement
time

was found between the three conditions. For the
GenStu(t3) the mean for the exponential scoring
design (c2) was significantly higher than the mean
for the reward free condition (M = 0.9, SD =0.19; M
= 0.84, SD = 0.21 respectively). No significant
differences were found between the linear (c1) and
both reward–free and exponential conditions. The
interaction can be seen in Figure 6.
In addition there were main effects of group size (d)
and of number of game rounds (k).
Generalizing the observations, the exponential
reward function leads to higher contribution,
participation, duration, and engagement time in the
GenPub and GenStu groups. Exponential points
reward catalyzes knowledge pooling. The GenPub
responded similarly to the GenStu but at lower rates,
i.e. it is more difficult to pool knowledge from the
GenPub compared to the GenStu. The hardest
challenge is to pool knowledge from the ExpStu
accompanied by a surprisingly short duration.
Possibly, less fun (serious questions) leads to less
participation and contribution and less attention
displayed by duration.

6. Discussion
Designing a game scoring mechanism to support
achieving objectives is a relevant practical issue, as
well as an academic interest particularly in light of
the increased use of gamification in recent years [3,
4, 29, 46]. Most of the studies in gamification
embedded a combination of motivational factors:
points, leaderboards, and levels [41], dual point
systems and rating [6, 37, 38], leaderboards, ranking,
unlocking information [47], progress, points, ranking,
network [48], leaderboard, badges [49], challenge,
progress bar, theme, rewards [44], badges, levels[50],
points, levels, avatar [44]. The distinct effect of point
scores on users’ behavior and motivation is still
vague, a gap we wish to narrow.
The current study focuses on the effect of scoring
design on each of three types of crowd in an
implementation of a knowledge pooling game for
crowds. We applied three scoring mechanisms:
reward-free, linear and exponential in three types of
crowd: GenPub, ExpStu and GenStu. We examined
contribution of responses, participation, duration, and
engagement time as dependent variables. Results
showed a significant interaction between score design
mechanism and types of crowd indicating that the
groups behaved differently in reaction to the scoring
condition. The analysis for duration yielded main
effects for the scoring condition and type of crowd.
Overall, in answer to our research questions we
can generalize the following assertions: 1.
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implementing a point allocation mechanism promotes
performance depending on the implementation. 2.
linear point progression is detrimental to performance
while exponential score allocation is favorable. 3. A
crowd of experts is more difficult to mobilize than
general crowds. Given general questions, students
show better performance than the general public. In
the following we unpack the particular observations
that led to these generalizations.
Looking into the contribution behavior (amount
of content) results suggests that for the GenPub and
for the ExpStu exponential scoring design may be the
more effective method when compared to linear and
reward-free conditions. The GenStu appear to be
indifferent toward these different scoring designs
methods. Exponential scoring design may also be the
more effective method to increase duration when
compared to the reward-free condition, while the
difference between the linear and both reward-free
and exponential scoring was found to be
insignificant.
Examining the types of crowd it appears that
GenStu participants spend a longer time on each
question compared to the other two groups.
Examining engagement time more closely, it appears
that exponential scoring design is more effective
when compared to reward-free conditions for both
the GenPub and the GenStu. In regard to the GenPub,
it is also more effective when compared to linear
condition. In contrast, the ExpStu appear to be
indifferent about different scoring designs methods
relating to engagement time.
Participation in the GenStu group was
significantly higher than that of the GenPub, yet it is
interesting to observe that the same pattern occurred
for both GenPub and GenStu (t1 and t3). For these
two groups both exponential scoring design and
reward free condition seem to be more effective
when compared to the linear condition. ExpStu seems
to be indifferent for reward free and linear condition.
Thus, it appears that linear scoring is least effective.
To conclude, the present study highlights the
importance of point scoring mechanism design in
games for crowds. Findings suggest that linear
reward crowds out intrinsic motivation while
exponential reward may strengthen motivation in
relation to the reward free condition. Table 6
summarizes the complete matrix of the experiment
results. Interestingly, the percentage of questions
answered (participation) by the ExpStu (t2) was
significantly lower in the exponential condition
compared to the other conditions and ExpStu
exploited less of the available game time (lower
engagement time), yet the average responses per
question answered was significantly higher. This

suggests that scores enhance intrinsic motivation,
because mere “hunger” for points would lead to full
usage of the available game time and questions.
Participation for GenPub was almost the same for
exponential and reward free conditions, yet
engagement time and contribution were significantly
higher in exponential scores. This suggests that
scores serve as informative feedback generating
motivation.
Table 6. Summary of the exponential
condition
Expone
Contribu Durati Engage
Participa
ntial vs. tion
on
ment
tion
reward
free
t1
+ n.s
- n.s
GenPub
t2
+ n.s
- n.s
ExpStu
t3
GenStu

+ n.s

- n.s

6.1. Limitations and Future Research
The main limitation of the current study is the
sample size which is modest considering we are
interested in crowds. Another limitation is that we
implemented just two score design mechanisms.
This being an experiment, although a natural
experiment as far as the general public goes, external
validity may be questioned.
The ﬁndings suggest several points of departure
for future research: 1) Group size – the effect of
group size was significant in regard to our variables,
indicating that the larger the group the lower the
contribution of responses, participation and duration
per question. This may imply diffusion of
responsibility. It may be the expected emergence of
a power law distribution, a well-known phenomenon
of the web [51], which leads to higher diversity in
levels of participation. 2) Replaying- repeated play
(k) has a significant effect on engagement time. This
raises the question of differences between highlymotivated users and average users and could also
provide new insights into the design of effective
gamified crowdsourcing systems for different target
groups. 3) Quality- in the current study users were
rewarded with points for every response. Our next
step will be to explore the quality of responses.

6.2. Conclusions
This work contributes to the area of
crowdsourcing and gamification, especially games
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for crowds. Its main novelty lies in bringing together
crowdsourcing and game capabilities for different
scoring mechanism designs. When designing crowdbased knowledge pooling, gamification can help if
implemented according to our findings. I.e., care
should be taken in selecting whether and how to use
points, and attention should focus on the type of
crowd as well as the relation between the type of
knowledge collected and the type of crowd.
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